

The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative and its Impact on Democratization and De-Democratization Processes

Wolfram Schaffar
University of Passau
International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS), Leiden



一带一路 One Belt One Road (OBOR) / Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)




Freedom in the World 2018

Democracy in Crisis

Democracy in Retreat


Freedom in the World 2019



- Democracy faced its most serious crisis in decades in 2017 as its basic tenets—including guarantees of free and fair elections, the rights of minorities, freedom of the press, and the rule of law—came under attack around the world.
- Seventy-one countries suffered net declines in political rights and civil liberties, with only 35 registering gains. This marked the 12th consecutive year of decline in global freedom.



Pax Americana => Pax Sinica Democracy => Authoritarianism?



The Broader Context of BRI

- 'Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation' 中华民族伟大复兴 (Not 'Rise of China'!)
- 'Community of Shared Destiny' / 'Community of Common Destiny' 命运共同体, (cf. Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere)
- 'New type of great power relations' 新型大国关系

To ease worries, President Xi Jinping has emphasised "Three Noes Policy 三不政策"

- (1) No interference in the internal affairs of other nations
- (2) China does not seek to increase the so called "sphere of influence"
- (3) China does not strive for hegemony or dominance

The BRI MoU does not comes with conditionalities concerning the type of government...

No open and direct influence of BRI on democratisation processes

Competing Interpretations of BRI (IR)

1) Rise of a new global power, (new) type of imperialism

Reeves (2018) *Imperialism and the Middle Kingdom* (TWQ), Huotari, Gaspers, Eder, Legarda, Mokry (2017), Legarda (2017, 2018), Embong, Evers and Ramli (2017)

 \Rightarrow Clear prediction of de-democratisation, triggered by BRI

Benner, Gaspers, Ohlberg, Poggetti, Shi-Kupfer, 2018, Authoritarian Advance (Merics, GPPi)

2) New type of globalisation

- China as a new guardian of global free trade (Hartman, Maening, Wang, 2017)
- Anti-neoliberal South-South cooperation project (article series from the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS), Liu, Dunford and Gao (2018) or Liu and Dunford (2016)
- \Rightarrow No effects of de-democratisation connected to BRI

- 3) No plan but "initiative 倡议" trial and error
- 4) New Chinese-style paradigm of IR

tributary relations (朝贡体系)

under heaven (天下)

Godehard, 2016, 2017, No End of History? A Chinese Alternative Concept of International Order (SWP), Noesselt (2010, 2015) and Mokry (2018)

⇒ Ambiguous predictions concerning democratisation

5) Beyond IR – need of a different approach

- IR paradigms departing from "state interests" and "state behaviour" do not work
 - actors, interest groups and political dynamics beyond the state level
 - specific dynamics of change connected to a shift in the World System
- Neo-Gramscian approach, combined with aspects of World-Systems Theory
- \Rightarrow Sinophone Borderlands Interactions at the Edges

Missellaneous

- Authoritarian gravitation centres (Demmelhuber/Kneuer, 2016)
- Nature of instructure projects
 - Long-term planning needs authroitarianism
- Unintended Effects (Kavalski, 2019)

Home

in a nutshell

Especially since 2000s, scholars observed 'reverse waves' of democratization or realized that some regions had been characterized by a remarkable autocratic durability and had not been influenced by the waves of democratization in the 20th century. The conceptualization of Authoritarian Gravity Centres (AGC) intends to contribute to this academic debate. The purpose of the project is...

- To implement the model of AGCs that characterizes as autocratic regimes that constitute a direct lever or an indirect force of attraction for countries in the proximity
- To better understand, assess and explain possible mechanisms of autocratization by focusing on autocracy promotion and diffusion in the regional context
- To concentrate on three world regions for empirical evidence (Central Asia, Middle East, Latin America)



BRI and – Democracy ... towards a comparative research agenda

Political conflicts and dynamics of democratisation and de-democratisation

Three Regions (Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Eastern Europe)


- Thailand (coup d'état in 2014)
- Myanmar (exacerbated ethnic conflict since 2014)
- Bhutan (border conflict and military standoff in 2017)
- Mongolia (hyper-extractivism and anti-Chinese mobilisation)
- Greece (labour conflict connected to Chinese investment)
- Italy (authoritarian populism with Chinese backing)

Myanmar

- Since 2010/2012: political and economic opening
- ⇒ Cancellation of Mitsone Dam project
- ⇒ Democratisation process in Myanmar:

Escape China's grip, strategy to diversify development options / investment partners


- National peace process, Myanmar Peace Center, supported by the EU
- 2015: National Ceasefire Agreement (21st Century Panglong), ...
- 30 March 2016: Aung San Suu Kyi becomes State Counsellor
- ⇒Frosty relations with China, but regular visits
- Late 2016: Rohingye crisis deepens




- Federal Political Negotiation and Consultation Committee (or FPNCC, Northern Alliance)
- UWSA demands a Chinese-led peace process
- January 2018, new KIA leader, N Ban La (non-Christian)

| | National Ceasefire Agreement Signatories: | # | Other: |
|----|--|--------|----------------|
| 01 | Karen National Union/ KNLA | 5,000 | Max est. 7,000 |
| 02 | Restoration Council of Shan State/ Shan State Army South | 8,000 | |
| 03 | Democratic Kayin Benevolent Army | 5,000 | BGF |
| 04 | Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (Kloh Htoo Baw Battalion) | 1,500 | |
| 05 | All Burma Students Democratic Front | 400 | |
| 06 | Pa-O National Liberation Organisation* | 400 | |
| 07 | Chin National Front* | 200 | |
| 08 | Arakan Liberation Party | 60 | Max est. 100 |
| 09 | Karen National Liberation Army Peace Council | 200 | |
| 10 | New Mon State Party | 800 | 2,000 reserves |
| 11 | Lahu Democratic Union | 0 | |
| | NCA Total Estimated Fighters: | 21,560 | |

| | Non-signatories: | # | Other: |
|----|---|--------|-----------------|
| 10 | United Wa State Party | 30,000 | 30,000 reserves |
| 11 | Kachin Independence Army/ Organization* | 10,000 | Max est. 15,000 |
| 12 | Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Kokang)* | 2,000 | Max est. 3,000 |
| 13 | National Democratic Alliance Army (Mongla) | 3,000 | |
| 14 | Shan State Progress Party/ Shan State Army North** | 8,000 | |
| 15 | Ta'ang National Liberation Army | 6,000 | Max est. 10,000 |
| 16 | Arakan Army (Kachin branch- not Paletwa branch) | 3,000 | |
| 17 | Karenni National Progressive Party | 600 | |
| 18 | National Socialist Council of Nagaland- Khaplang | 500 | |
| | Non-NCA Total estimated fighters: | 63,100 | |



Map showing the route of the China-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines. (Image: Shwe Gas Movement)



Assessment of the political processes:

- China is back as the most important investor and actor
- The democratisation process is stalled



Home » Business » China hopes to resume Myitsone hydro dam

China hopes to resume Myitsone hydro dam

MYO LWIN | 09 MAR 2016



Children look at the Myitsone dam from the bank of Ayeyarwady River in 2012. Photo:

A Chinese state-owned company says it is hoping to resume a major hydropower project in Myanmar that was suspended in late 2011 by President U Thein Sein following widespread public dissent:



ASEAN BEAT

Myanmar Speeds up Progress on China's Belt and Road

Naypyidaw picks up the pace on the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor as other options for FDI fade away.

By Amara Thiha December 08, 2018










In late November, Ning Jizhe, deputy head of China's National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), visited Myanmar and met with State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and the minister of planning and finance along with other ministers. A week later, on December 6, the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) implementation steering committee, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, met. Years after the launch of China's Belt and Road Initiative, Myanmar is finally moving rapidly to embrace President Xi Jinping's project.



Myanmar State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, right, and Chinese President XI Jinping, left, attend their meeting at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing (May 16, 2017).

Image Credit: Damir Sagolj/Pool Photo via AP

CMEC is a bold step. It will bring China and Myanmar into the closet proximity ever in the history of their relationship, going far beyond trade and infrastructure development itself. This could the ace in the hole for Naypyidaw to overcome deadlocks in the country's peace process and stimulate foreign investments.

Thailand: Political polarisation







People's Allience for Democracy พันธมิตร ประชาชนเพื่อ United Front for Democracy & Against Dictatorship กลุ่มแนวร่วม ประชาธิปไตยขับไล่ แมด็ลภารแห่งคราติ





Thaivisa.com, 11. Januar 2015

Public Testimony of the Constitutional Court, January 2014

"These things, I think that if we are do them, they cannot be done in one night. If talking about the 2 trillion in order to bring in the high speed [rail] system. If about dual tracks, I won't say a single word about it and we don't need to waste any time on this. Dual tracks are very important. No need to waste time on changing lines/tracks like with trams in the past [...] and the 2 trillion Baht if [Transport Minister] Chadchart dies and is reborn then even for his children then the money will still not be paid [back] [...]



Gravel roads should be gone from Thailand first. Make them asphalt or something like that first before thinking about high speed [rail]. For high speed [rail], my personal opinion is that is that it is not really necessary for Thailand...

Thailand, 22th May 2014



From the military coup d'état to the judicial coup d'état





Frontpage of Bangkok Post, September 2006 and Fotomontage, May 2014

Assessment of the political processes:

 The coup d'état was triggered by elite competition over access to BRI projects

NEWS > TRANSPORT

High-speed train gets go ahead



The National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) has approved two high-speed train projects at a total cost of 741.4 billion baht. The two routes approved are intended to serve as a transport link between Thailand and southern China.

Proposals for a high-speed train from Rayong to Nong Khai - and on to China - were first made in October, 2013, at an exhibition sponsored partly by China Railways. (Photo by Chanat Katanyu)

PM jumpstarts high-speed trains



Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha and his wife Naraporn ride a Japanese high-speed train from Tokyo to Osaka on Feb 10, 2015. (Government House photo)

After taking high-speed trains in China and Japan, Prime Minister Prayut Chano-cha is considering bringing faster rail service to Thailand.

Gen Prayut used his *Returning Happiness to Thai People* broadcast on Friday to tout the benefits of equipping the country's railway system with high-speed trains once new tracks are built.



BRI and de-democratisation in Myanmar - Thailand

- Reversal of democratisation processes
- Internal conflicts were augmented by Chinese investment,
- With more or less direct Chinese intervention

but

- Conflicts pre-exist Chinese investment
- No clear preference of China concerning the type of government
- ⇒ Imperial chain, Primacy of internal factors

 (Neo-Gramscian perspective, Poulantzas, 1979, *The crisis of dictatorships*)



Doklam Standoff

- Bhutan India relations, 1949, 2007 Friendship Treaties
- Bhutan China border negatiations since 1972, since 2000 no progress. Doklam and Bhutanese northern border remains disputed
- June 2017: China starts road construction on Doklam plateau
- 18 June: Indian troops move into the territory to stop construction
- 29 June: Bhutan declares that it still considers Doklam Bhutanese territory – after remained silent
- 28 August: Agreement between China and India to disengange
- July 2018: China-Bhutan border negotiations restarted


Fake news in Indian newspapers

CHINA FIRED ROCKETS ACROSS THE BORDER ON INDIAN BORDER INSTALLATIONS

July 17, 2017 Written by Web Desk Published in International News Last modified on Tuesday, 18 July 2017 10:34







China invites Bhutan to join Belt and Road Initiative

short by Nandini Sinha / 08:38 am on 25 Jul 2018, Wednesday

China has invited Bhutan to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), following the visit of China's Vice Foreign Minister Kong Xuanyou to the country. This was the first high-level visit by a Chinese politician to Bhutan since the Doklam standoff between India and China last year. The Doklam region is claimed by both China and Bhutan.

read more at Hindustan Times

China invites Bhutan to join its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative

Bhutan has received an official invitation from China to join its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The invitation was given to the Himalayan nation on Tuesday after senior Chinese minister visited the country. The two nations held talks over wide-ranging issues, including the disputed border.

It is important to note that Bhutan does not have an embassy in China and it is the only nation in the South Asian region which has not joined the Belt and Road Initiative, besides India. India refused to join the multibillion-dollar connectivity project due to sovereignty issues.

TIBETAN JOURNAL



China Wants To Connect Tibet To Nepal And India By Railway

Democratisation, Law and Gross National Happiness

Democratisation and elections in Bhutan:

- Gross National Happiness as alternative development paradigm
- 2008: Promulgation of the Constitution, Topdown democratisation process
- Elections in 2007/2008, 2013, 2018 lead to change of the government



Constitution of Bhutan, 2008, Art. 9: "to promote those conditions that will enable the pursuit of *Gross National Happiness*"

Assessment of the political processes:

- Rising influence / pressure from China
- But sustained commitment to democratisation

The New York Times

Centuries of Buddhist Tradition Make Room for Bhutan's First Law School







Development cooperation between the University of Vienna, ADA and the Jigme Singye Wangchuck School of Law






Mongolia

MONGOLIA OUTLOOK 2012

World's Fastest Growing Economy




Source: Eurasia Capital, a Mongolian brokerage, January 2012 Mongolia Outlook Report.



- Mongolia's bold neoextractivist policies:
- 17-20% economic growth
- Handing out shares of coal mine to people, 2011 cash handouts
- Social programmes, basic income
- Since 2011: fall of prices of raw material
- Public debt reaching sovereign debt crisis
- Unequal treaties disfavour Mongolian rent income

Mongolia's GDP growth rate

(in percent)



*Forecast Source: World Bank

BRI as way out of the crisis





Transportation Corridor: Proposed Railway



Anti-Chinese and Right-Wing Movements



Mongolia

Mongolian neo-Nazis: Anti-Chinese sentiment fuels rise of ultra-nationalism

Alarm sounds over rise of extreme groups such as Tsagaan Khass who respect Hitler and reject foreign influence



▲ Mongolian neo-Nazi group the Tsagaan Khas ('White Swastika') salute on the streets of the capital Ulan Bator Photograph: Dan Chung for the Guardian

Tania Branigan in Ulan Bator

Mon 2 Aug 2010 16.13 BST

THE | DIPLOMAT

After Anti-China Campaign Rhetoric, Mongolia's President Congratulates China on National Day

Campaign talk aside, Mongolia still depends overwhelmingly on China.

By Charlotte Gao October 03, 2017











Mongolia's newly-elected President Khaltmaa Battulga won office in July on the back of a campaign laced with anti-China rhetoric. Nonetheless, on September 28, Battulga sent a congratulatory message to Chinese President Xi Jinping, marking the 68th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China.



Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons/ News Mongolia

Democratisation in Mongolia

- The only democratic country in Central Asia
- Elections in June 2016, change of the government, consolidation of democracy
- MDG #9: Strengthen Human Rights and Foster Democratic Governance
- Basis for SDG #16: Peace Justice and Strong Institutions










MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOAL-9 INDICATORS AND THE STATE OF DEMOCRACY IN MONGOLIA



Greece

- Sovereign debt crisis deepens since starting in 2011
- EU Troika European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) - imposes austerity measures, privatisation of state assets
- 2008: China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO Group) takes over two container terminals in the habour of Piraeus
- 2016: China COSCO Shipping becomes the primary operator of the habour of Piraeus
- 2017: The State Grid Corporation of China, the country's biggest utility, said on Wednesday that it has completed purchase of a 24-percent stake in Greece's power grid operator, ADMIE





GREECE - POLITICS ECONOMY DIASPORA WORLD CYPRUS OPINIONS BLOGVIE

Chinese Cosco turns Piraeus into second largest port in the Mediterranean





Effects on Greek Democracy

- June 2017: Greece has blocks a European Union statement at the United Nations criticizing China's human rights record
- China welcomed as investor and competitor to the EU (based companies, EU conditionalities)
- Unclear long-term effects
 - Golden Dawn, right-wing movement, on the rise, on a tide of anti-EU sentiments
 - Golden Dawn also close to unions in Piraeus

red pepper

Greek dock workers feel betrayed by Syriza's broken promises

Dock workers in Greece are striking against further privatisations as Syriza's popularity tumbles, writes **Will Horner**March 7, 2016 - 6 min read



Striking dock workers from the Greek Federation for Port Employees (OMYAE). Photos: Will Horner

Golden Dawn: a nazi militia disguised into a "political party"

jailgoldendawn / 08/10/2017




Kasidiaris leading a Golden Dawn battalion squad in Nikea.

Processes of de-democratisation

- November 2011: Giorgios Panandreou, annouces a referendum on bail-out plans of the EU
- July 2015: Alexis Tsipras holds a referendum: 61,3% No vote. Result is ignored by EU.

"The sovereignty of Greece will be massively limited," *Jean-Claude Juncker*, President of the Eurogroup, Financial Times, 3. Juli 2011





Conclusion

Primacy of internal factors,

... but regional patterns

- 1. Southeast Asia: Exacerbation of pre-existing conflicts lead to de-democratisation, more or less direct Chinese involvement in conflicts
- 2. (Southern / Central) Europe: China is an alternative for countries are exposed to EU austerity policy. Cooperation with China enhances bargaining power against EU institutions.
 - De-democratisation (anti-EU sentiment spurs processes of de-democratisation)
- 3. Sino-spheric sandwich positions (Bhutan, Mongolia, Nepal)
 - Democratisation and pointed commitment to good governance as counterbalance to authoritarian Chinese mode of governance, (anti-Chinese sentiment translates into prodemocracy)
 - This might develop into a broader trend beyond the region (cf. Malaysia ...)